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The Christian Peace Ethic
and the Doctrine of Just War
from the Point of View of International Law
by Jost Delbrick and Klaus Dicke
Introductory Remarks*
The question of war and peace posed in an ethical perspective is much
older than international law and thus also much older than international law
concerns with and answers to the problem of war and peace, since inter-
national law as an inter-state legal order only dates back to the 16th/17th
century, when independent territorial entities (states) began to replace the
mediaeval feudal order. Questions posed and answers given by peace ethics
have, however, always been related to the positive law existing at a given
time, as ethics and law cannot be considered independently of each other. The
task set for this paper, therefore, is to contribute an analysis of how the
Doctrine of Just War is perceived by the international law of today - an
analysis which will be based on the historical pronouncements on the problem
of war and peace by peace ethics as well as by international law. The task
is a formidable one, given the very complex nature of the problems involved.
Among others, it firstly touches upon fundamental questions about the structure
of the international order; secondly, it involves the relationship between law
and the use of force, or non-violence, in the light of a multitude of grave
injustices in the world while at the same time objective terms and consented
criteria of what is just are lacking; and thirdly, it has to focus on an ethical
and legal evaluation of the phenomenon of war under the conditions of the
nuclear age. The task given is further complicated in view of the abundant
material to be covered.' In view of these difficulties, it cannot even be attemp-
* The following two articles are revised english versions of contributions prepared for the
Kieler Wocbe Kongrefl 1984 "Gottes Friede den V6Ikern". The proceedings of this congress
have been published by Ulrich Wilckens / Eduard Lobse (eds.), Gottes Friede den V61kern,
Hannover 1984.
1 Out of the plenty of literature the following works shall be mentioned: Arthur Nussbaum,
Just War. A Legal Concept, in: Michigan Law Review 42 (1943), 453-479; Ernst Reibstein,
V61kerrecht. Eine Geschichte seiner Ideen in Lehre und Praxis, vol. I, Freiburg/Miinchen 1957;
Robert W. Tucker, The Just War, Baltimore 1960; Lynn H. Miller, The Contemporary
Significance of the Doctrine of Just War, in: World Politics 16 (1963/64), 254-286; Paul
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ted to propose any final answers. Rather, the paper can offer only some basic
contributions to a discussion which is currently undertaken as an internal one
within the churches and which - as one may observe - shows much of an
aporetic character and yet must be continued. Just as ethical discussions are
characterized by sometimes strongly divergent opinions, international law
treatment of the Doctrine of Just War - insofar as it is undertaken at all -
shows a broad range of views expressed. These range from a linear projection
of the Augustinian-Thornistic doctrine of bellum iustuM2 into the present
world to the total rejection of the doctrine as irrelevant to international law
and include, e. g., the proposition that international law has overcome the
doctrine.3
In a first section of the paper the development of international law pro-
nouncements on the bellum iustum Doctrine will be sketched out (I). In a
second section, the question whether the bellum iustum Doctrine is relevant to
present day international law or whether the doctrine has been overcome, will
be treated in the light of the outlawing of the use of force (II). Finally,
tendencies in international law to revive the Doctrine of Just War - as they
can also be discerned in the discussion of peace ethics - and the problems
Ramsey, The Just War. Force and Political Responsibility, New York 1968; Donald A. Wells,
How much can "the Just War" Justify? In: The Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), 819-829;
James Turner Johnson, Just War. The Nixon-Doctrine and the Future Shape of American
Military Policy, in: The Year Book of World Affairs 29 (1975), 137-154; Yehudin Melzer,
Concepts of Just War, Leyden 1975; Christopher D. Jones, Just Wars and Limited Wars:
Restraints on the Use of Soviet Armed Forces, in: World Politics 28 (1975/76), 44-68;
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historic Illustrations, New
York 1977; Walter Klaassen, The Doctrine of the Just War in the West. A Summary, in:
Peace Research Review 7, No. 6 (1978), 1-70; Hedly Bull, Recapturing the Just War for
Political Theory, in: World Politics 31 (1979), 588-599; Rainer Steinweg (ed.), Der gerechte
Krieg: Christentum, Islam, Marxismus, Frankfurt 1980; William V. O'Brien, The Conduct
of Just and Limited War, New York 1981; James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and
the Restraint of War. A Moral and Historical Inquiry, Princeton 1981; Norbert Glatzel/
Ernst Josef Nagel (eds.), Frieden in Sicherheit. Zur Weiterentwicklung der katholischen Frie-
densethik, Festschrift (Fs.) Martin Gritz, 2nd ed., Freiburg/Basel/Wien 1982; James E.
Dougherty, Just War, Nuclear Weapons, and Noncombatant Immunity (Review Article), in:
Orbis 26 (1982/83), 765-787; Wolfgang Lienemann, Kernwaffen und die Frage des gerechten
Krieges als Problem 6ikumenischer Friedensethik seit 1945, besonders im Blick auf den
Protestantismus in Deutschland, Habilitationsschrift Heidelberg 1983; James Turner Johnson,
Can Modern War be Just? New Haven/London 1984; Trutz Rendtorff, Christian Ethics and
the Doctrine of Just War. A Re-evaluation in the Nuclear Age, in this volume, 209-228.
2 Inis L. Claude, Just Wars: Doctrines and Institutions, in: Political Science Quarterly 95
(1980), 83-96; for the Augustinian-Thomistic doctrine see: Klaassen (note 1), 12-21; Paulus
Engelhardt, Die Lehre vom "gerechten Krieg" in der vorreformatorischen und katholischen
Tradition, in: Steinweg (ed.) (note 1), 72-124.
5 Otto Kimminich, Der gerechte Krieg im Spiegel des V61kerrechts, in: Steinweg (ed.)
(note 1), 206-223; Stanley Hoffmann, Duties beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possi-
bilities of Ethical International Politics, Syracuse 1981, 45-93.
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and dangers implied in these tendencies for the structure of the international
order will be outlined (III).
I. The Doctrine of Just War in the Development
of International Law until the End of World War I
International law as an inter-state legal order has been fully in keeping with
the Augustinian-Thomistic Doctrine of Just War only in its very beginnings
which were shaped by the Spanish Scholastics. When the so-called "fathers of
international law" - among others, Bartolom de Las Casas (1474-1566),
Francisco di Vitoria (1480-1546) and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) -
began to discuss the Spanish colonial expansion in the New World in terms
of the Doctrine of Just War, and thereby laid the foundations of international
law, the Doctrine of Just War as a combination of Roman political philosophy
(Cicero) and Christian ethics (St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas) and could be
summarized as follows: 4 A war is a "just war", if it is waged by the
legitimate government (auctoritas principis) - be it as an aggressive or a
defensive war -; if secondly, a just cause (iusta causa) can be shown for
waging the war - be it for defending against an illegal attack, or for the
reason of restoring the law violated by the other party; and finally, if the
war is conducted in the right intention (recta intentio) in the sense, that good
shall prevail over evil. The overall aim of the war had to be peace in the
sense of a just order or - as it is put in a different version - in the sense
of order and harmony5 . Based on this aim the function of the Doctrine of
bellum iustum was to limit war, that is, to limit its initiation as well as its
conduct. This limiting function could be performed by the Doctrine of Just
War only because it was based on a value system which was recognized
universally as objective and which provided the criteria for judging what was
to be considered "just", "good" or "bad", and thereby set clear and relatively
narrow limits to an arbitrary instrumentalization of war. In view of the basic
consent of the time, it is not by chance that one spoke of "just war" and not
of "justified war": the problem was not - in modern legalistic terms - to
justify war in a particular case as an otherwise illegal act. Rather, the idea
was that war, in meeting the ethical criteria of the Doctrine of Just War, was
4 On the historical roots of just war theory see: Reibstein (note 1); Klaasen (note 1);
Kimminicb (note 3); Wilhelm Grewe, Epochen der V6lkerreditsgeschichte, Baden-Baden 1984,
131-147; Frederick H. Russel, The War in the Middle Ages, Cambridge 1975.
5 The Concept of order and harmony as a concept of peace was developed by Augustine
and Thomas Aquinas along the terms of the Aristotelian philosophy of order. See: Hans
Buchheim, Aurelius Augustinus' Friedensbegriff als Konzept einer modernen Theorie des
Friedens, in: Fs. Wilhelm Grewe, Baden-Baden 1981, 425-444 (428); Max Miller, Der
Friede als philosophisdses Problem, in: id., Erfahrung und Geschichte. Grundziige einer Philo-
sophie der Freiheit als transzendentale Erfahrung, Freiburg/Muinchen 1971, 357-374.
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per definitionem a just act which could even be ethically mandatory., Legal and
moral authority, legal and ethical argument had not been distinguished 7.
Under the impression of reports of the cruel subjugation of the Latin
American Indios, the Spanish Scholastics posed critical questions with regard
to the traditional Doctrine of Just War. Although not totally denying the
right of the Spanish King to conquer the New World, they began, however,
to make distinctions in applying the criteria of the Just War Doctrine to the
war against the Indios. In doing so, they questioned the existing consensus
about the unreflectedly accepted criteria of just war as such. Thus, for
instance, Vitoria wanted to have a distinction drawn on the side of the
unjust party of a war between an intended injustice for which the party
could be held subjectively responsible, and an objective injustice.8 Different
legal consequences were to be accorded to these two sets of circumstances: in
case of an objective injustice the unjust opponent could be subjugated only,
while in the former case both subjugation and punishment were the proper
sanctions. This was an important distinction with regard to the Indios' fate.
Withholding punishment meant - at least theoretically - the chance for the
subjugated Indios to be integrated into the peace order established after the
war ended.
On the theoretical level, such distinctions meant that the catalogue of criteria
of just war was now open to an ever increasing relativity of the individual
criterion. It was no great step from the distinction between "intended" and
"objective" injustice to the consideration whether both parties to a war could
have just causes on their side - in their subjective judgement, at first, and
later also objectively. The way to an increasing dissociation of peace ethics
vested with absolute authority and the relativist juridical outlook was theor-
etically paved. The Doctrine of bellum iustum lost its formerly effective
function to limit war.
6 The mandatory character of a just war is asserted by various concepts of "holy war".
See, e. g., Christiane Rajewsky, Der gerechte Krieg im Islam, in: Steinweg (ed.) (note 1),
13-71 (19-21). Johnson (1975) (note 1), 144-148, pointed out that the American tradition
of just war theory derives from the intellectual heritage of the holy war doctrine in post-
reformation England.
7 The emergence of a distinction between legal and moral authority has been one of the
most significant developments in legal thought between the 16th and 17th century. See,
David Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, in: Harvard International Law Journal 27
(1986), 1-98. This distinction and its peacekeeping function for any legal system is distorted,
when just war theorists refer to the philosophical bellum justum tradition and the legal ius
in bello norms at the same time without any regard for the difference between moral and
legal obligation.
8 Kimminich (note 3), 208/9. To establish such a distinction, Vitoria refers expressively not
to objective criteria of just and unjust, instead he is one of the first seeing the upcoming
function of public opinion as the legitimate judge in questions of public justice. See Engelhardt
(note 2), 91, 94.
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When the mediaeval system faltered politically and spiritually, and the new
territorial entities arose, i. e. the modern state system emerged, and when,
finally, two separate Churches were established, the new notions of the criteria
of just war were applied in practice. Sovereign princes and states of equal
standing confronting each other in case of a conflict, acted as their own judges
over the justice of their causes.9 The bellum iustum "ex utraque parte" as a
new notion was formulated by Vitoria for the first time.10 It was taken over
by Alberico Gentili (1552-1608)" and by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) in his
monumental international law treatise "De jure belli ac pacis" and was thereby
introduced into the teaching of classic international law. 12 Soon brought to its
extreme, the notion led to the proposition and acceptance of the free right of
the sovereign state to go to war (liberum ius ad bellum). International law
and peace ethics from now on went their own ways. While on the part of the
Protestant Church the preservation of peace and the settlement of disputes
by arbitration were postulated, and defensive war was accepted as a just war
only when embarked upon as ultima ratio13, international law freed itself of
the fetters of the Just War Doctrine. The loss of the unity in faith and of a
shared trust in true values was intensified in the practice of international law
by the influence of Machiavellian thought which did not treat the question of
war in ethical terms, but only with regard to the interests of the state.14
International law during the 18th and 19th centuries was dominated by
the notion of liberum ius ad bellum. It was no longer a question whether a
war was just in the mediaeval sense, but whether a war was conducted in
conformity with the laws of war (ius in bello). As weaponry became ever
more sophisticated, the protection of non-combatants and the observation of
the principle of porportionality of means and ends15 were considered to be
part of these laws of war in due course of time. Both criteria also were already
recognized in the classic period of the Doctrine of Just War, as for instance
9 Heinrich Kipp, Pax et securitas oder pax et iustitia im V61kerrecht, in: Urn Recht und
Freiheit, Fs. Friedrich August v. d. Heydte, Berlin 1977, 153-277; Ulrich Scheuner, Krieg als
Mittel der Politik im Lichte des V51kerrechts, in: Clausewitz-Gesellschaft e. V. (Hrsg.), Frei-
heit ohne Krieg? Beitrige zur Strategie-Diskussion der Gegenwart im Spiegel der Theorie von
Carl Clausewitz, Bonn 1980, 159-181.
10 Grewe (note 4), 241-244. See also Kennedy (note 7), 32, 65-74.
11 Grewe, op. cit., 244, 247-254; cf. Kimminich (note 3), 210.
12 On Grotius see: Grewe (note 4), 254-259; Peter Hoggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine
de la guerre juste, Paris 1983.
Is Cf. Carl Dietrich Erdmann, Luther Uiber den gerechten und ungerechten Krieg (Berichte
aus den Sitzungen der Joachim-Jungius-Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, Heft 5), Gittingen
1984.
14 For historical illustration, see: Kimminich (note 3), 212. See also: Scheuner (note 9).
15 See: Karl Josef Partsch, Armed Conflict, Fundamental Rules, in: Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.),
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (EPIL), vol. 3, Amsterdam/New York/Oxford
1982, 18-31; Jost Delbriick, Proportionality, in: EPIL, vol. 7, 1984, 396-400 (398).
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by Suarez, but also in the very early times by St. Augustine. Both aggressive
and defensive war under the new doctrine were to be considered to be lawful
action and needed no substantive, ethical legitimation or justification by
positive law.
The experience, however, of the devastating wars at the end of the 19th
century (inter alia the American War of Secession, the Italian struggle for
national unity, the German-French War of 1871) and the two World Wars
in the 20th century have confronted international law again with the problem
of the ethical and legal permissibility of war as a means of politics. Yet
international law did not seek a solution of this problem by a restauration or
the fresh introduction of the Doctrine of Just War. A more radical approach
was taken: War, and more precisely, any use of force as a political means was
to be rejected as illegal and unethical. Increasing attempts at strengthening
the laws of war (ius in bello) at the end of the 19th century were paralleled
and - in the eyes of some international lawyers - overtaken by the demand
for a general prohibition of war as well as any other kind of inter-state and
international use of force.
At this point, attention must turn to the question, where modern inter-
national law, changed as it has in conformity with the demands just mentioned,
stands with regard to the Doctrine of Just War. Is this doctrine still relevant
or - as is contended by some authors -, has it to be considered as inadequate
and thereby overcome by new rules because the criteria of just war can no
longer be applied today - let alone the question whether they could have
ever been applied in international law?
II. The helium lustum Doctrine in the Light
of the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Modern International Law
A survey of the relevant international law rules has to be undertaken on
two levels - not the least because of the nature of the current ethical dis-
cussion within the churches. 0 On the one hand, one must look at norms
16 See: Evangeliscbe Kirche in Deutschland, Denkschrift: Frieden wahren, f rdern und
erneuern, Giitersloh 1981; the pastoral letters of the National Conferences of U. S. and
German Catholic Bishops (1983) are reprinted in German in: Hirtenworte zu Krieg und
Frieden, K61n 1983, 125-285; 1-93. For some critical and historical analysis Jost Delbriuck,
Die Auseinandersetzungen Uiber das ethische Problem der atomaren Kriegfiihrung in den
Vereinigten Staaten und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Abschreckung und Entspannung.
Finfundzwanzig Jahre Sicherheitspolitik zwischen bipolarer Konfrontation und begrenzter
Kooperation (Verbffentlichungen des Instituts fUr Internationales Recht an der Universitit
Kiel 76), Berlin 1977, 94-147; Franz B6ckle / Gert Krell (eds.), Politik und Ethik der Ab-
schre&ung. Beitrige zur Herausforderung der Nuklearwaffen, Mainz/Miinchen 1984; Heinbard
Steiger, Gerediter Friede. Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil und die Pipste zur Internationalen
Friedensordnung, in: Fs. Hans Ulrich Scupin, Berlin 1983, 489-516; Rendtorff (note 1) with
further references.
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relating to the general prohibition of war and the rules allowing for certain
exceptions (ius ad bellum). On the other hand, one has to focus on the level
of a "just" - or in modern legal terms - "lawful" conduct of war (ius in
bello). Furthermore, it will have to be shown that - in considering the
problem of nuclear weapons - both levels could merge in pursuance of a
specific line of argument.
1. The Abolishment of the Liberum ius ad bellum
in Modern International Law
The League of Nations Covenant 17 already knew a considerable restriction
of the right to go to war (Art. 11-13 of the Covenant). These restrictions
were, however, more of a procedural than a substantive nature. Parties to a
conflict were under an obligation first to seek a peaceful settlement of the
dispute, before they could legally go to war. Furthermore, they had to observe
certain cooling off periods after the failure of a peaceful settlement before
force could be lawfully used. The Briand-Kellogg-Treaty (Treaty of Paris) of
192818 changed these restrictions into an explicit and general prohibition of
wars of aggression - a prohibition which according to an overwhelming
majority of opinion rapidly developed into a rule of customary international
law, thus binding non-treaty states as well. The United Nations Charter19
again broadened the scope of this norm into a general prohibition of the use
or the threat of use of force in international relations. Every state in the world
is bound to this rule, either directly or indirectly. However, in consequence
of a realistic assessment of human behaviour, whereby it is realized that prohi-
bitions by themselves do not guarantee that the prohibited act does in fact
not occur, states remain entitled to the right of individual and collective self-
defence. Defensive war is still legal. Thereby, international law has legitimized
the existence of today's military alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) or the Warsaw Pact, which, indeed, have proven to
17 For the development of international rules concerning the prohibition of war and the
use of force in international relations see Karl Ulrich Meyn, Kriegsverbot und Gewaltverbot,
in: Jost Delbriack (ed.), Friedensdokumente aus fiinf Jahrhunderten. Abriistung, Kriegsver-
hiitung, Rilstungskontrolle, vol. I, Kehl/Strasbourg/Arlington 1984, 35-47, with related
Documents 48-72 (League of Nations Covenant 40-54).
18 League of Nations Treaty Series (LNTS) 94, 57; Meyn (note 17), 56/57.
19 United Nations Conference on International Organization Documents, vol. XV (1945),
335; Meyn (note 17), 58-61. For further discussion on the prohibition of the use of force
in international relations by the United Nations Charter see Ian Brownlie, International Law
and the Use of Force by States, Oxford 1963; Wilhelm Wengler, Das vblkerrechtliche Gewalt-
verbot. Probleme und Tendenzen, Berlin 1967; Winfried Scbaumann (ed.), V8lkerrechtliches
Gewaltverbot und Friedenssicherung, Baden-Baden 1971; Christian Tomuschat, Gewalt und
Gewaltverbot als Bestimmungsfaktoren der Weltordnung, in: Europa-Ardiv (EA) 36 (1981),
325-334.
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be one of the essential regional structures of international order.20 However,
Art. 51 of the UN-Charter restricts the right to self-defense in that it can
be exercised only until the UN-Security Council has taken the necessary steps
for the preservation of international peace and security.
A further exception from the general prohibition of the use of force is
provided for by the UN-Charter in that the Organization may collectively
employ force against acts of aggression or breaches of the peace. It must be
stressed at this point that these provisions in the United Nations Charter are
strongly opposed to every Just War Doctrine. It may be possible to recognize
the punitive nature of sanctions provided for by the League of Nations Cove-
nant as remnants of the bellum iustum-Doctrine21 . However, the peace-keeping
system as provided for by the United Nations Charter is clearly distinguishable
in two ways from a theoretical deduction of just reasons for war within the
framework of Just War Doctrine. Firstly, the Charter's measures of collective
security are not established within an ontological concept of peace or just
order; rather, the Charter as well as modern international law draws a clear
distinction between peace-keeping on the one hand and positive norms of
enhancing justice among nations or so-called "peaceful change" on the other
hand. Thus, the peace-keeping efforts of the Charter are meant to avoid
breaches of peace already in the forefield of military conflicts. Secondly, the
case of a breach of peace is not defined theoretically. Instead, Art. 39 of the
Charter provides for a political procedure to determine what constitutes a
breach of peace within the institutionalized framework of the Security Council.
In order to meet the requirements of this procedure, the United Nations after
long and frustrating debates in 1974 have adopted a Definition of Aggression 22
which is meant to serve as the basis for decisions on whether an act of aggres-
sion has been committed. It has to be noted, however, that this Definition of
Aggression is replete of general clauses and loopholes, thus rendering it of
limited practical value. Thus, for instance, an act of aggression is prima facie
deemed to have occured if one state fires 'the first shot' against another,
provided, however, that the Security Council does not determine otherwise.
20 Jost Delbriick, Eine Internationale Friedensordnung als rechtliche und politische Gestal-
tungsaufgabe. Zum Verstindnis rechtlicher und politischer Bedingungen der Friedenssicherung
im internationalen System der Gegenwart, in: Frieden politisch f6rdern: Richtungsimpulse.
Sechs Beitrige fiir die Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, Giitersloh 1985, 145-172; id.,
Peace through Emerging International Law, in: Christian Schmidt / Dieter Senghaas / Raimo
Vdyrynen (eds.), The Quest for Peace (to be published in 1986).
21 Miller (note 1), 261; Hans Webberg, Krieg und Eroberung im Wandel des V6lkerrechts,
Frankfurt/Berlin 1953, 19 etseq.
22 General Assembly (GA) Res. 3314 (XXIX), 14. 12. 1974, in: GA Official Records
(GAOR) (1974), suppl. No. 31, 142-144; cf. Thomas Bruba, Die Definition der Aggression.
Faktizitit und Normativitit des UN-Konsensbildungsprozesses der Jahre 1968-1974, zugleich
ein Beitrag zur Strukturanalyse des V61kerrechts, Berlin 1980; Meyn (note 17), 69-72.
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Furthermore, wars of liberation waged by peoples under colonial oppression
are not considered to be covered by the rules of the Definition of Aggression.
There is also disagreement as to whether humanitarian intervention, i. e. the
use of force for the protection of fundamental human rights (Entebbe case),
is legal under international law.2 1
2. The ius in hello
While the struggle for outlawing war as such is a relatively recent one
- a fact which has to be recognized in order to avoid any rash conclusions
about the ineffectiveness of the prohibition of war -, endeavours to limit the
means of war by positive international law date back much further. It is
impossible here to recall the complete number of rules of ius in bello. Only
the basic traits and elements of ius in hello as they are contained in the Hague
Convention on the Rules of Warfare of 190724 and in the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 and 197725, may be summarized at this point. Their overriding aims
are the protection of civilians and the observation of the principle of
proportionality. In accordance with the latter, weapons are outlawed which
cause unnecessary suffering and which have an undiscriminating effect, i. e.
cannot be limited to military objectives only.
These rules, amied at providing for some degree of protection and restraint
in the use of weapons extend to both parties. War - at least in theory -
thereby is characterized not as an event outside the realm of law, but as
regulated by particular rules of law.
And war - once it occurs legally - becomes illegal only, when those same
laws are violated. This means that a defensive war as well may become illegal
once a breach of the ius in hello occurs. It has to be noted with regard to
nuclear weapons, however, that international law so far has tended to outlaw
the first use of nuclear weapons only, but does allow for their use in answer
to a nuclear attack (response in kind), thereby indicating that the mere pos-
session of nuclear weapons is legal. There is, however, even disagreement on
this basic premise in that it is maintained that even the first use of nuclear
weapons out of military necessity is legal in cases of an exceptionally grave
23 See: Ulrich Beyerlin, Die israelisdie Befreiungsaktion von Entebbe in v6lkerrechtlicher
Sicst, in: Zeitschrift fiir auslindisches 6ffentliches Recht und Valkerrecht (Zab5RV) 37 (1977),
213-242; Helmut Strebel, Nochmals zur Geiselbefreiung in Entebbe, in: op. cit., 691-710.
The problem of humanitarian intervention under the condition of Art. 2 (4) of the UN
Charter is discussed by Meyn (note 17), 35; Tomuscbat (note 19), 327.
24 James Brown Scott, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, 3rd ed.,
New York 1918.
25 United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) 75 (1950), 31, 85, 135, 287; International Legal
Materials (ILM) 16 (1977), 1391, 1442.
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threat to a state.28 But even if one considers the first use of nuclear weapons
to be a lawful act, its lawfulness cannot be justified in terms of objective and
generally applicable criteria provided for by an ethical doctrine. Rather, a
state is legally permitted to take measures of self-preservation, including the
first use of nuclear weapons2 7. Such legally permitted acts of self-preservation,
however, are limited by the rules of warfare and are restricted to the preser-
vation or restoration of the status quo ante. Thus, the defending state is
entitled to use only such weapons as are necessary for the achievement of that
purpose".
3. International Law Interpretations of the Existing Law
with Regard to the Doctrine of Just War
The law of the prohibition of war has not been explicitly or implicitly
developed in terms of the Doctrine of Just War, rather it was intended to
overcome this doctrine. Yet neither international law nor ethics can avoid the
question as to whether this doctrine still is relevant to international law and its
future development. This is not only because the present day discussion of
ethics and legal policy poses these questions ever more urgently, but because
- as has been stated at the outset - law and ethics are categories closely
related to each other. The number of interpretations of the existing law by
international lawyers or others in the light of the Doctrine of bellum iustum
is limited. In order not to confuse the picture, only the most important
positions may be outlined and discussed here briefly.
a) An interesting interpretation of the prohibition of the use of force
within the context of its institutional foundation, i. e. the United Nations, has
been offered a few years ago by the American political scientist and inter-
national lawyer lnis Claude". In the eyes of Claude the establishment of the
United Nations and the prohibition of the use of force that went with it,
means the restauration of the mediaeval foundations of the Doctrine of bellum
iustum, but under secular conditions. The Organization takes the place of Pope
28 See: Dietrich Rauschning, Nuclear Warfare and Weapons, in: EPIL, vol. 4 (1982), 44-
50; Michael Bothe / Karl Josef Partsch / Waldemar Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed
Conflicts. Commentary on the two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
1949, The Hague/Boston/London 1982, 188 etseq.; Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules for
Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Additional Protocol I, in: Virginia Journal of
International Law 26 (1985), 109-170 (163-166).
27 Karl Joseph Partsch, Self-Preservation, in: EPIL vol. 4, 1982, 217-220. For the position
of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning nuclear weapons and particularly the first
use question, see, Gerlinde Raub / Peter Malanczuk, V61kerrechtliche Praxis der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland im Jahre 1983, in: Zeitschrift fiir auslindisches 6ffentliches und V61kerrecht 45
(1985), 714-833 (809 seq.).
28 Delbriick, Proportionality (note 15), 397.
29 Claude (note 2).
Jost Delbriick / Klaus Dicke
and Emperor as the authoritative judges over the question of whether a war
is Just or unjust. This parallel seems very convincing at first sight. However,
it does not grasp the true problem posed by the Doctrine of Just War today:
It is true, that the United Nations may be viewed theoretically as being vested
with the authority to judge upon the justice or injustice of acts of war. They
lack, however, the objective criteria - or criteria perceived as being objective
- founded on ethics, a prerequisite of the Doctrine of Just War in the Middle
Ages. The loss of the universally shared philosophy of true order is not matched
by the existence of the Organization of the United Nations and their decision
making process.
b) The opposite position considers the Doctrine of Just War to be over-
come by international law. The views expressed by Otto Kimminich90 may be
cited as an example: "There is, therefore, nothing left of the ius ad bellum of
classical international law. War as a means of international politics is outlawed
and ethically rejected. There is no justification of war whatsoever, and this
also pertains to preventive war". The obligation to preserve the peace has
thereby been put side by side with the prohibition of war. Kimminich con-
tinues: "The right of every state to individual and collective self-defense, as it
is enshrined in Art. 51 of the UN-Charter, is no exception to the prohibition
of war. This right . .. is comparable to the right of self-defense as it is
recognized in the national legal orders. It becomes meaningful only when
considered against the background of the prohibition of war. For self-defense
is allowed only against criminal acts!" Self-defense exercised by a state is not
a "just war", but a justified repulsion of a criminal act which, however, as
such is subject to the rules of warfare, in order to bring to bear the notion of
law and peace even in a situation dominated by the use of force.
From a conceptual point of view31, one has to agree with Kimminich that
the acceptance of the right to self-defense by the United Nations was not at
all intended to revive the Doctrine of Just War. In fact, however, it cannot
be denied that the exercise of the right to self-defense amounts to undertaking
a defensive war. Thus, the law of the United Nations - in seeming con-
formity with the Doctrine of Just War (for instance, as interpreted by Luther)
- has reduced the right to go to war (ius ad bellum) to one single case, i. e.
30 Kimminich (note 3), 216/17 (translated from the German original).
31 Cf. Jost Delbriick, Peacekeeping by the United Nations and the Rule of Law, in:
Robert J. Aceermann / Pieter J. van Krieken / Charles 0. Pannenborg (eds.), Declaration on
Principles. A Quest for Universal Peace, Fs. Bert V. A. Roeling, Leyden 1977, 73-99;
Albrecht Randelzhofer, Der normative Gehalt des Friedensbegriffs im V6lkerrecht der Gegen-
wart - M6glichkeiten und Grenzen seiner Operationalisierung, in: Jost Delbrik (ed.), V8I-
kerrecht und Kriegsverhiitung. Zur Entwidlung des V6lkerrechts als Redt friedenssidiernden
Wandels (Veri~ffentlichungen des Instituts fir Internationales Recht an der Universit~it Kiel 82),
Berlin 1979, 13-39; Wilhelm G. Grewe, Friede durch Recht? Berlin/New York 1985.
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the defense against armed aggression after attempts at a peaceful settlement
have failed; but this is only in seeming conformity with the Doctrine of Just
War because international society is pluralistic, adhering to heterogenous
value systems and, therefore, is not in a position to prescribe objective ethical
criteria for the embarking on a defensive war. Thus, a defensive war according
to the law of the United Nations, is a war justified by positive law as
distinguished from an ethically just war: it can, but it need not meet the
criteria of an ethically just war.
While international law in restricting the right to go to war to one case,
i. e. defensive war, did not adopt the Doctrine of Just War in the sense of a
doctrine based on objective criteria of justice, it has, on the other hand,
opened itself by the structure of the relevant norms to an ethical interpretation
in terms of the Just War Doctrine. In other words, it has created conditions for
a close relatedness of law and ethics in this field. In taking up this new per-
spective in some interpretations of present day international law - based on
the traditional Doctrine of Just War -, the problem of a just defensive war
including the question of a just preventive war are discussed and, furthermore,
the justice of a defensive war is scrutinized under the terms of the ius in bello.
Others, departing from the same methodical basis, tend to consider it impos-
sible to undertake defensive wars in the nuclear age legally, since the ius in
bello once and for all proscribes the use of nuclear weapons.
c) As examples for the first line of argument outlined above, the works of
O'Brien, Ramsey and Walzer may be mentioned here.3 2 They consider defensive
wars, including the use of nuclear weapons as just (and legal) if these weapons
can be applied in conformity with the principle of proportionality and pro-
vided that utmost protection can be secured for non-combatants. O'Brien, in
weighing the pros and cons in this context, uses the formular of "double
effect" 33 which says, although loss of civilians cannot be avoided even in
restricting the application of weapons to military objectives, that this would
not render the use of these weapons illegal, as long as such losses are not inten-
tionally brought about and are as small as possible.
On the other hand, O'Brien's factual argument - the possibility of a
controlled use of nuclear weapons - is taken up and answered in the negative:
a controlled use of nuclear weapons which would meet the criteria of the ius in
bello was impossible. Thereby, at least the defensive war carried out with
nuclear weapons is ethically rejected and considered to be illegal, - one
could also say, nuclear war can no longer be judged in terms of the Doctrine
of Just War. At this point - as has been mentioned before - the two levels
32 Supra note 1.
33 O'Brien (note 1), 42-55; Melzer (note 1), 158. Delbrilck (note 16), 109 seq.
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of arguments - that of the general prohibition of the right to go to war (ius
ad bellum) and that of the ius in bello - merge: based on a strict application
of the rules of the ius in bello, the general prohibition of war is extended at
least to the nuclear defensive war.
These attempts at penetrating present day international law as shaped by
the UN system with the categories of the classical Doctrine of Just War, (either
with the consequence of a limited admissibility of nuclear defensive war, or
with the consequence of rendering nuclear defensive war altogether illegal there-
by coming close to a pacifist stance, have not been generally accepted. This was
impossible to achieve because the essential prerequisites for a full scale inte-
gration of the Doctrine of Just War into international law are lacking: The
representatives of the views outlined, under the conditions of a pluralistic
heterogenous international society cannot prove the criteria of just war used
by them to be universally valid. However, only if this condition - universal
validity of the criteria - could be met, the Doctrine of Just War could
fulfill its war limiting function. As this cannot be proved, adopting the cate-
gories of just war would enhance the danger already existing of abusing the
doctrine for ideological purposes.
At this point, we may conclude that the recognition by international law
of defensive war as justified by positive law is categorically different from the
concept of Just War in ethical terms. In this sense, adoption of the Doctrine
of Just War by international law has not yet occured. Furthermore, the
Doctrine of Just War has to be considered as overcome by international law,
since a lawful defensive war is limited in its aims. It may be embarked upon
only for the restauration of the status quo ante; but it may not be undertaken
for the punishment of the aggressor or for achieving a new state of order,
transcending the mere purpose of defense. On the other hand, it has to be
recognized that on the level of the ius in bello elements of the Doctrine of
Just War - i. e. the notion of the protection of non-combatants and the
principle of proportionality - have been introduced into international law
and shaped its aims and scope. These are being -discussed, in their full implic-
ations, however, only rather reluctantly. While trusting the effectiveness of
the system of nuclear deterrence as the dominant structural element of inter-
national order in the post-war era, the legal problems implied in the failure of
deterrence are more or less being neglected. In this respect, there are striking
similarities with the current ethical discussion.
The result reached so far - no full scale adoption of the Doctrine of Just
War by international law - is, however, challenged by new developments
arising from very different backgrounds. They will be taken up in the
following final section of the paper.
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Ill. Tendencies towards a Renaissance of the Doctrine of Just War
The developments which have to be taken up here, may be exemplified by
three political phenomena: the national wars of liberation of peoples under
colonial rule, the military intervention of the Warsaw Pakt members in the
CSSR in the context of the so-called Breznev doctrine and the US policy
towards Central America and the Caribbean (Grenada, Nicaragua). All three
cases have in common the first use of force or the threat of the use of force
without a prior armed attack having occured. While in the case of wars of
liberation at first attempts have been made to justify them as acts of self-
defense against an aggression which was seen in the continued existence of
colonial rule, this line of argument was later abandoned and wars of liber-
ation as such were regarded as generally justified. 4 In the two other mentioned
cases the justification for the use of force was argued to consist in the
preservation or restauration of a particular regional order in the spheres of
influence of the Superpowers.35 Here we encounter - at times explicitly -
the criteria of the classical Just War Doctrine. The "iusta causa" is found in
the achievement of national self-determination or in the preservation of peace
in a region by fending off any dangers threatening the existing order. The
"recta intentio" is represented by the will to preserve the peace and establish
a just order (pax et iustitia).36
The reasons for these tendencies are obvious. The UN system which has
outlawed the active use of force as a means of politics, has utterly failed in
its peace preserving function and in its task to bring about peaceful change.
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Thereby, it denied to the member states the necessary substitute for the use
of force in cases of conflict. The regional alliances, which from the global
perspective have a vital peace preserving function, are by their nature status
quo orientated and, therefore, are only in a limited sense suitable for the
initiation and realization of peaceful change. In the Third World such func-
34 During the negotiations of the Geneva Protocols Additional of 1977 some delegations
argued, "that wars for national liberation against colonial or racist powers were just wars
and for this reason had to be treated in the same way as wars between States", BothelPartsch/
Soilf (note 26), 40.
35 See, e. g., Christopher C. Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada. Reflections on
the Lawfulness of Intervention, in: American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 78
(1984), 131-144; John Norton Moore, The United States Action in Grenada. Grenada and
the International Double Standard, in: AJIL 78 (1984), 145-168; Boris Meissner, Die
Breshnev-Doktrin, Kaln 1969.
36 Kipp (note 9); for the associated ideas "pax et iustitia" in the Mediaeval history of
law see: Hans Hattenhauer, Pax et iustitia (= Berichte aus den Sitzungen der Joachim-
Jungius-Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften 3), Gbttingen 1983.
37 Delbrfick, Internationale Friedensordnung (note 20); id., V61kerrecht und Weltfriedens-
sicherung, in: Dieter Grimm (ed.), Rechtswissenschaft und Nadbarwissenschaften, vol. 2,
Miinchen 1976, 179-191.
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tioning regional systems are lacking almost completely. The reversion of some
states or people to the attitudes of the epoch before the prohibition of force
had become effective was therefore only a question of time. However, these
are no more than practices to which legal recognition to date has not been
forthcoming, even if in the case of the wars of liberation a significant number
of non-binding resolutions were passed by the General Assembly of the UN,
which underline the legality of such wars and call for their support". As a
matter of principle, the consolidation of such tendencies from the point of
view of international law ought to be strongly opposed; they could lead to
a complete erosion of the principle of the prohibition of war, the normativity
of which is a precarious one anyway. In view of the lack of objective criteria
shared by the community of states, even an only limited admission of the
first use of force for certain iustae causae would rapidly break the dam
of the principle of the prohibition of war.
For what people, what state would not be able to show sufficiently "just
causes"? As already explained regarding the existing law, the community of
states lacks the basic requirements for a functioning Doctrine of Just War.
Therefore, a solution of these problems must not be sought on the basis of
traditional Just War Doctrine, for international law has set as its priority the
preservation of peace while at the same time contributing to the establishment
of an equitable world order through the development of rules defining new
values3 9 This opens up perspectives for a linkage between law and ethics in
the area of international law, that appear more promising than a renaissance
of the bellum iustum Doctrine. This is not meant to say that an ethical dis-
cussion of the body of law on the issue of war and peace has become irrelevant.
Rather, this discussion ought to be undertaken not on the classical bellum
iustum Doctrine but on the level of an ethics of bona fide observance of
positive law.
In other words, the ethical foundation of the principle of the prohibition
of force is to be found in the ethical imperative whereby those rules of positive
law demanding the preservation of peace must be obeyed. In this sense,
international law is dependent upon both theology and philosophy for the
development of a universal legal ethic.
38 Beginning with GA Res. 3070 (XXVIII) of November 30, 1973, in: GAOR 28, suppl.
No. 30, 78. Henn-Juri Uibopuu, Wars of national liberation, in: EPIL (note 15), vol. 4,
1982, 343-346 with further references. See also, Wil D. Verwey, Decolonialization and Ius
ad Bellum: A Case Study on the Impact of the United Nations General Assembly on Inter-
national Law, in: Declarations on Principles (note 31), 121-140.
39 Jost Delbriick, Menschenrechte - Grundlage des Friedens? In: Hans Thimme / Wilhelm
W6ste (eds.), Im Dienst fiir Entwiddung und Frieden. In memoriam Bisdsof Heinrich
Tenhumberg, Mainz/Miinden 1982, 89-102.
